Balancing Structural and Attitudinal Approaches to Care Economies in Jordan and Tunisia

Introduction

Care work, defined as (usually unpaid) material and affective labor, such as childrearing, maintaining households, and caring for the elderly, is essential to the reproduction of social systems (also known as “social reproduction”). Because women are typically the ones performing this unpaid work, care work—in its current form—is also key to maintaining gender inequality. Care economies encompass care work, such as childcare, housework, and care of other family members, as well as the broad set of economic, social, and political dynamics related to the provision and organization of care, including the formal and informal systems and policies that support these activities. 

Across the globe, one of the most persistent barriers to women’s full participation in the labor force is the lack of childcare. In Arab states, this issue is even more acute. According to the latest wave of survey data from Arab Barometer, women identify the lack of accessible, affordable, and quality childcare as one of one of the top two barriers to entering the workforce.[1] The women surveyed from Jordan (43 per cent) and Tunisia (41 per cent) cite the affordability of childcare as the main barrier and notably, “concerns over cost are not diminished in importance by income”.[2] The Arab Barometer also finds that women in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) spend ten times more hours on unpaid care work and perform 4.7 times more unpaid care work than men—a trend reinforced during the COVID-19 pandemic—and the most recent opinion survey revealed declining support for women to play a decision-making role in the household and to have equal job opportunities outside the house.[3] Care work is also defined as one of the main barriers to female labor force participation in the MENA region, which has one of the lowest rates globally. In view of this context, how do women in MENA view their needs regarding workforce participation and, related to this, what labor policies and practices are needed to establish a sustainable care economy?   

This paper comprises a comparative assessment of the economic policies related to care work and social reproduction, also known as “work-family reconciliation policies”, in two MENA states: Jordan and Tunisia.[4] These two case studies were selected as they each represent an example of a country with a female labor force participation rate which is either below or well below the global average. The paper will then provide policy recommendations, combining approaches that prioritize the inclusion of women in the existing economy but that also propose changes to the economic structure to make it work for women, and that disrupt traditional gendered divisions and understandings of labor—what some have referred to as “non-reformist reforms”.[5] It is imperative that MENA states not only overcome the structural barriers that persist but also the attitudinal barriers that can inadvertently increase the burden of work (formal and otherwise) that prevent women from achieving economic independence. 

Context: Low Female Labor Force Participation in the MENA Region

According to the latest estimates from the World Bank, the female workforce participation rate in the MENA region is as low as 20.4 per cent.[6] However, there is variance within the region. Gulf countries such as Bahrain (44.1 per cent), Kuwait (47.6 per cent), Qatar (64.1 per cent), and the UAE (55.4 per cent) are above or close to the global average. Meanwhile, Algeria (16.8 per cent), Egypt (16.5 per cent), Iraq (11.4 per cent), Jordan (14.0 per cent), Syria (14.1 per cent), Palestine (18.9 per cent), and Morocco (19.8 per cent) are well below it. Somewhere in the middle, we find Saudi Arabia (34.5 per cent%), Tunisia (26.9 per cent), Libya (34.8 per cent), and Lebanon (27.5 per cent)—each a slightly unique case.[7] When we look at the women who are in employment in MENA, it is of note that in Jordan, the split between those employed in the public sector and those in the private sector, which, among others, includes family businesses, farming, and textiles, is roughly equal, while in Tunisia, women show a marked preference for public sector employment.[8] 

The business case for increasing female labor force participation has been widely made. Research by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) shows that women’s participation in the labor force is key to boosting growth, improving productivity, and increasing incomes.[9] When women enter the workforce, they bring new skills into the workplace and take their newly acquired income back to the household, which increases the labor supply, elevates levels of household income, and result in higher levels of consumption. Closing the gender gap in the labor force has the potential to boost gross domestic product (GDP) by 8.2 per cent in emerging markets, 7.1 per cent in low-income developing countries, and 5.4 per cent in advanced economies.[10] To quantify it another way: in MENA, 2.7 trillion USD could be added to regional GDP and 28 trillion USD to global GDP.[11]

Feminist scholars have been rightly critical of international development practitioners and policymakers for promoting a form of “neoliberal” feminism that locates women’s empowerment in their economic participation and consumption.[12] Yet, it is undeniablethat through participation in the formal labor force, women have the potential to realize their full rights, including access to social services and decision-making, as well as some control over their own capital and labor. Women are already working—but as unpaid carers. As such, their work is not taken into account in national statistics and does not provide them with certain economic rights such as access to social services. Moreover, women are not able to accumulate wealth through care work. Men, on the other hand, are able to accumulate wealth through formal work. This discrepancy is part of what maintains the system of gender inequality. While increasing women’s participation in the labor force alone may certainly help individual women, it does not change the fundamental premise of the economy—unpaid care work which disadvantages women. Feminist policies that aim to dismantle the gendered notions of care work itself will not only shift gender attitudes but have the potential to affect transformative systemic change. 

Tunisia: Attitudinal Change 

In Tunisia, where the female labor force participation rate is 26.9 per cent, work-family reconciliation policies are quite comprehensive on paper.[13] In 2024, Tunisia updated its parental leave and benefits policies and women are now entitled to maternity leave of up to 15 days before birth and three months afterward. Men are only entitled to seven days of leave altogether. However, discrepancies remain between the public and private sectors. In the public sector, both women and men are entitled to full salary as compensation, while in the private sector, they are only entitled to a limited allowance from social insurance of two-thirds of their average daily wage, which is capped at twice the minimum wage. In terms of the right to return to work, the new law guarantees job protection and prohibits dismissal for taking leave.[14] Additionally, women who work in the private sector—particularly in small-scale family businesses (6.5 per cent) and rural women (32.3 per cent)—may not be afforded these same protections or they may not be as well regulated.[15]

If we look more closely at the case of rural women: they usually work for free in family businesses such as farming and have additional responsibilities, such as “bringing water to households, a typical rural non-renumerated task; it is hard because it means walking for hours being exposed to heat in summer and cold in winter”.[16] Besides the hardship taking responsibility for them entails, these tasks are time intensive. In fact, a 2006 study showed that women in Tunisia spend approximately five hours per day on domestic work compared to 39 minutes for men. In 2017, another study showed that girls spend 6.4 hours per week on domestic work compared to 4.9 hours for boys.[17] A study by UN Women shows that the proportion of time spent on unpaid domestic and care work, by sex, age, and location varies, with women reporting 1.67–21.94 per cent and men reporting 0.35–2.7 per cent.[18]

However, cultural attitudes regarding the household division of labor are shifting. According to the Arab Barometer VII Survey, 17.4 per cent of respondents said the female household head should help children with their studies, 73.1 per cent said this responsibility should be divided equally between the male and female head of the household, and 6.3 per cent said it was the responsibility of male head of the household. When it comes to budgeting and spending for the household, 9.6 per cent said it is the female household head’s responsibility, 34.5 per cent% said this is down to the male head of the household, and 54.7 per cent said it should be split equally.[19] The 2021 survey showed that, in response to the prompt “taking care of the home and children is a woman’s primary responsibility”, 18.6 per cent strongly agreed, 32.9 per cent agreed, 26.9 per cent disagreed, and 20.4 per cent strongly disagreed.[20] The fact that the majority of respondents hold relatively gender-equitable views regarding caring for children and maintaining the household is promising. It shows that cultural attitudes are shifting at a faster pace than state and economic structures. 

In 2010, Tunisia adopted a national strategy aimed at empowering women socially and economically through programs such as food self-sufficiency and access to healthcare and public services. However, this was linked to a national strategy on combatting gender-based violence, which limited its scope and ability to directly target workforce participation.[21] Since then, President Kais Saied has rolled back hard-fought gains in women’s rights—specifically making it harder for women to run for political office, failing to amend the unequal inheritance laws or to allocate government resources to combat gender-based violence, and repealing circular no. 20 which guaranteed gender parity in appointing senior government officials.[22] Tunisian feminists are not optimistic what gains it will be possible to make in this “backsliding democracy”, especially after Saied’s 2022 constitution merged state and religion.[23] While there is little state support for improving female labor force participation through implementing work-family reconciliation policies, it is reassuring that sociocultural attitudes toward care work are relatively gender equitable. 

Jordan: Structural Change 

Jordan is a unique case in the MENA region, as it has one of the lowest levels of female labor force participation (less than 14 per cent).[24] In the latest Arab Barometer survey, 33.5 per cent of the women surveyed in Jordan cited the lack of childcare as the biggest barrier to entering the workforce. 

As part of their vision for economic modernization, Jordan aims to grow their female workforce participation rate to 28 per cent by 2033.[25] As part of this national plan, the government has introduced some legislation and programming to address childcare. According to World Bank Resident Representative in Jordan Holly Benner writing in “The Jordan Times”,the country has nearly 1,200 nurseries, most of which are public institutions. Yet, these nurseries only “have the capacity to serve less than 3 per cent of children under 5 years of age”.[26]In the private sector, if a company employs more than 20 married women, they are, according to labor legislation, supposed to provide facilities for childcare for children under the age of four. But, in practice, companies do not meet that threshold.[27] The law has since been amended requiring all private companies to provide childcare in if they have 15 or more employees, regardless of the gender and marital status of these employees.[28] The Jordanian National Council for Family Affairs aims to establish at least 80 childcare centers in which private companies are supposed to cover 50 per cent of the salaries of the workers at these facilities for 12 months.[29] Most of these facilities remain inaccessible, both financially and geographically, to the majority of Jordanians. 

Despite the government’s efforts to meet the demand for childcare, some structural challenges persist in Jordan. When it comes to parental leave policies, the policy for women still only entitles them to less than 12 weeks of parental leave (ten weeks for women in the public sector and 90 days for women in the private sector), with only three days for men. However, women who do take parental leave are compensated 100 per cent of their salary through a “social insurance system”.[30] The protection period for dismissal is only two weeks, and there is no guaranteed right to return to work.[31]

In addition to Jordan’s lack of childcare services and parental leave, there is stronger support for allocating the responsibility of household work to women. According to the 2023 Arab Barometer opinion survey, 34.1 per cent believe that the female household head should be responsible for helping children study compared to 52.7 per cent in support of equally shared responsibility, and 3.5 per cent who believe the male household head should bear this responsibility. In a previous survey, 28.7 per cent strongly agreed and 35.2 per cent agreed with the statement “taking care of the home and children is a woman’s primary responsibility”, while just 26.0 per cent disagreed and 10.0 per cent strongly disagreed. Interestingly, budgeting and spending tilts slightly toward being a male responsibility, with 43.3 per cent seeing it as the responsibility of the male household head compared to 8.4 per cent believing it is the female household head’s job and 46.2 per cent opting for equal responsibility. 

Some studies have quantified the time spent on childcare and other forms of care work such as maintaining households. A study by the Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development (ARDD) found that the ratio of women’s to men’s time spent on care work is 19 to 1. The same study found that, in Jordan, 51.3 per cent of women over the age of 15 consider care work to be their primary activity.[32] In terms of the actual time spent, a 2016 study found that married women spent 26.7 hours per week on care work, and for women with children under the age of three, this increased by 5.2 hours per week.[33] In Jordan, in contrast to Tunisia, state and economic structures are making much more rapid progress than sociocultural attitudes. While this top-down approach is certainly creating social security nets, it must be coupled with provisions that shift norms in order to be effective.  

Conclusions and Recommendations 

Based on the number of women employed in the public sector across the region, governments should invest in a public infrastructure for childcare facilities. However, as countries aim to diversify and move away from reliance on the public sector, a more concerted effort should be made to bring the private sector into line with the public sector’s work-family reconciliation policies. 

Other policies have been introduced with the aim of helping women balance formal and care work or, at least, mitigate the burden of care work. For instance, after the COVID-19 pandemic, work-from-home/telework and flexible work hours have become the norm. While these policies may certainly free up some of the time women would otherwise spend in the office or commuting, they do not fundamentally restructure the gendered balance of care work. These policies may even have adverse effects, such as reinforcing gender norms regarding women’s responsibility for childcare on top of their paid work. 

Another frequently proposed policy is cash assistance programs and subsidies. The ARDD survey asked women in Jordan about their preferred proposals for care work and found that 46.3 per cent would prefer to be paid, 22 per cent said they would prefer to get professional help, and 31.7 per cent said they would prefer to have things continue as they are.[34] In light of these attitudes, it would seem that introducing cash assistance programs and other forms of care subsidies would be key steps toward reducing the financial burden on families in Jordan (the same cannot be said for Tunisia where attitudes regarding the burden of care work are rapidly shifting). However, similar to telework policies, cash assistance programs and subsidies should not be used in isolation or as a long-term solution to care work, as they may inadvertently increase the burden of work on women and do not instigate long-term shifts in the gendered division of care work. 

One of the most promising structural changes that is set to disrupt traditional gendered divisions and understandings of labor through policy is expanded family leave policies. While the recent changes to parental leave in Tunisia are positive, the current leave policies in both Tunisia and Jordan still convey different messages about what is expected of men and women. Moreover, “parental leave” should be extended to include elderly and disabled family members. While the familial leave policies and cash benefits for women should certainly be expanded, men should also be entitled to equal benefits in this regard. This would be express new gender norms and promote an equal—gender-neutral—division of labor. These types of “non-reformist reforms”, or policies that directly address structural gaps while slowly shifting norms, are best suited to address the issues surrounding care work. 

Faria Nasruddin is an associate at the Middle East Program. In this role, she leads the Middle East Women’s Initiative. Faria is an experienced researcher and policy analyst focusing on women and gender issues, specifically UNSCR 1325/the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, women’s political and economic participation, and gender-based violence. Previously, Nasruddin served as the programs and events manager at the Middle East Institute, where, among other projects, she coordinated Track II dialogues. She was also a consultant with the Overseas Development Institute, a London-based think tank, where she developed a landmark report and case studies on gender norm change using broadcast media. She holds an MA in Middle Eastern Studies from Harvard University and a BA in History from Bowdoin College in Maine, USA. 

[1] Roche, MaryClare (2024). Gender Attitudes and Trends in MENA: The Effects of Working Women. Arab Barometer, August. Available at https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/AB8-Gender-Report-EN.pdf#page=7.79. 

[2] Ibid.

[3] Al-Shami, Salma and Maitha Alsuwaidi (2023). Confounding and confirming expectations on the ‘care economy’ in MENA. Arab Barometer, March 6. Available at https://www.arabbarometer.org/2023/03/confounding-and-confirming-expectations-on-the-care-economy-in-mena. 

[4] See: İlkkaracan, İpek (2012). Why so Few Women in the Labor Market in Turkey? Feminist Economics, vol. 18, no. 1: 1–37. 

[5] Akbar, Amna A. (2022). Non-reformist reforms and struggles over life, death, and democracy. Yale Law Journal, vol. 132: 2497–578.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

^[8] International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Dept. (2022). Jordan: Selected Issues. IMF Staff Country Reports 2022, 222, A001; Alaref, Jumana Jamal Subhi, Samira Nikaein Towfighian, Gustavo Nicolas Paez, Mohammed Thabet M Audah. Tunisia Labor Market Field Experiment Paper. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. Available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/883031600275794384/Tunisia-Labor-Market-Field-Experiment-Paper. 

[9] Lagarde, Christine and Jonathan D. Ostry (2018). Economic Gains from Gender Inclusion: Even Greater than You Thought. IMF Blog, November 28. Available athttps://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2018/11/28/blog-economic-gains-from-gender-inclusion-even-greater-than-you-thought; Verick, Sher (2018). Female labor force participation and development. IZA World of Labor. 

[10] Sayeh, Antoinette M.,  Alejandro Badel, and Rishi Goyal (2023). Countries That Close Gender Gaps See Substantial Growth Returns. IMF Blog, September 27. Available at https://www.cfr.org/womens-participation-in-global-economy.

[11] Ibid. 

[12] See, for example: Roberts, Adrienne (2015). The Political Economy of ‘Transnational Business Feminism’: Problematizing the Corporate-led Gender Equality Agenda. International Feminist Journal of Politics, vol. 17, no. 2: 209–31.

[13] UN Women Women Count. Country Snapshots Tunisia. Available at data.unwomen.org/arab-states/country/tunisia

[14]   Cherif, Imène (2024). Bridging Gaps: Tunisia’s New Law on Parental Benefits. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Blog, October 2. Available at

mena.fes.de/blog/e/bridging-gaps-tunisias-new-law-on-parental-benefits.html

[15] Moghadam, Valentine M. (2023). Explanations for Women’s Limited Economic Participation and Empowerment in the MENA Region. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, May 29. Available at https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/05/29/explanations-for-womens-limited-economic-participation-and-empowerment-in-the-mena-region/; Oxfam (2019). Counting on Women’s Work Without Counting Women’s Work. 

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] UN Women (2023). Country Snapshots, Tunisia. Women Count. Available at https://data.unwomen.org/arab-states/country/tunisia. 

[19] Arab Barometer, Wave VII. 

[20] Arab Barometer, Wave VI-C (2021). 

[21] Oxfam (2019). Counting on Women’s Work Without Counting Women’s Work.

[22] Ibid; Said, Ikram Ben (2023). Confronting Assault on Democracy in Tunisia. Sada Middle East Journal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 14. Available at https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2023/03/confronting-an-assault-on-democracy-in-tunisia?lang=en; Bin Azouz, Kenza (2022). President Saied Derides the Economic and Social Rights of Tunisian Women. Human Rights Watch, September 1. Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/01/president-saied-derides-economic-and-social-rights-tunisian-women#_ftn1; El Atti, Basma (2022). From Bourguiba to Saied: The instrumentalisation of women’s rights in Tunisia. The New Arab, March 23. Available at https://www.newarab.com/analysis/instrumentalisation-womens-rights-tunisia; El Atti, Basma (2024). Tunisia’s women focus on Saied’s ‘misogyny’ during national women’s day. The New Arab, August 14. Available at https://www.newarab.com/news/tunisia-women-protest-saieds-misogyny-national-womens-day. 

[23] Bin Azouz, Kenza (2022). President Saied Derides the Economic and Social Rights of Tunisian Women. Human Rights Watch, September 1. Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/01/president-saied-derides-economic-and-social-rights-tunisian-women#_ftn1.

[24] World Bank Press Release (2023). Increasing Women’s Economic Participation is Key to Jordan’s Long-Term Growth and Development. December 19. Available athttps://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/12/19/increasing-women-s-economic-participation-is-key-to-jordan-s-long-term-growth-and-development#:~:text=In%20particular%2C%20the%20female%20labor,the%20lowest%20in%20the%20world. 

[25] Weldali, Maria (2024). ‘Care Arabia’: Creating quality childcare for working women of Jordan, Lebanon. The Jordan Times, June 6. Available at https://jordantimes.com/news/local/care-arabia%E2%80%99-creating-quality-childcare-working-women-jordan-lebanon. 

[26] Ibid.

[27] Khurma, Merissa (2024). Empowering Women Changemakers in the Middle East: Opportunities and Challenges. Middle East Institute panel, September 16.

[28]  Alhawarin, Ibrahim, et al. (2020). The Care Economy in Jordan: Towards Recognizing, Reducing, and Redistributing Unpaid Care Work. Policy Brief No. 3, Progress of Women in the Arab States 2020: The role of the care economy in promoting gender equality. UN Women-ILO Joint Programme. 

[29] Oxfam (2019). Counting on Women’s Work Without Counting Women’s Work.

[30] ILO Global Care Policy Portal, https://webapps.ilo.org/globalcare/.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Husseini, Rana (2022). Study gauges value of women’s unpaid care work in Jordan. The Jordan Times, January 4. Available at https://jordantimes.com/news/local/study-gauges-value-womens-unpaid-care-work-jordan. 

[33] Alhawarin, Ibrahim, et al. (2020). The Care Economy in Jordan: Towards Recognizing, Reducing, and Redistributing Unpaid Care Work. Policy Brief No. 3, Progress of Women in the Arab States 2020: the role of the care economy in promoting gender equality, UN Women-ILO Joint Programme. 

[34] Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development (2021). Care Matters: The Value of Women’s Unpaid Care Work in Jordan, December.