Winning the BAM: CSO Advocacy Power, what is Next?

Negotiations on the Just Transition Work Program (JTWP) intensified from the second day of COP30. Daily contact groups worked through the informal notes from SB62 alongside the reports emerging from the third and fourth JTWP dialogues. Yet even in the final hours before the closing plenary, civil society organisations (CSOs) remained uncertain whether Parties would adopt the text establishing the JTWP mechanism, now referred to as the Belem Action Mechanism (BAM).

Across contentious contact group sessions, the most difficult points of disagreement between developed and developing countries centred on unilateral trade measures, the risk of reducing the JTWP to a set of technical “toolboxes,” and the push by some Parties to convert it into an action plan rather than an institutional structure. Not to mention the huge disagreement on the Means of Implementation (MoI), especially access to finance and technology transfer. 

JTWP as a Battleground, Who Sneaks their responsibilities, Revealing Power dynamics at Plays in the negotiation Rooms: 

• The Finance Battle: Tactics for Shifting Burdens? Who benefits?

If anything highlights, it's that COP30 is the COP of bold truth, sneaking from responsibilities without even hiding behind rhetoric. This was obvious throughout the JTWP negotiations, with many developed countries blocking progress on Means of implementation, such as finance, Technology transfer, and Capacity building, not to mention the diluting and resisting of establishing the Just Transition Mechanism. Moreover, reflecting back on this dynamic, it was manifested in the blocking by the EU and the UK as they were attempting to discard 12 paragraphs of the MoI and replace them with a single vague paragraph centred on “a variety of finance sources.” Needless to mention, they were blocking any references to the “Loss and Damage” fund in the preamble text.  Moreover, the UK and the EU were both strongest in deliberately deleting any obligation, diluting responsibilities, deleting most of the financial references and making it voluntary. This was also apparent in the negotiations, which they requested to delete references to Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, which anchors mandatory finance for developing countries, and opposed language linking finance to historical responsibility, attempting to oppose calls for grant-based finance for the JT. In addition, the battle around finance was also heated in their attempts to replace the cluster of finance paragraphs (21–24) with a single vague sentence emphasising the variety of sources, instruments, and channels. 

This is not only a technical disagreement between parties, but it is a clash over whether a just transition should redistribute resources, power, oppose all historical systems of capitalism and colonialism or just leave these inequalities untouched. The Global South countries recognised this and mostly unified around one goal: transitioning without finance and without technology is not a TRANSITION at all. This dynamic also manifests the classical attempts by Global North countries to shirk their historical responsibilities, defending their accumulated wealth through capitalist and colonialist systems. 

• Manifestation of False Solution in the Negotiation Room:  

False solution has been a main topic in the room during JTWP negotiations in COP30 this year. Starting from the meanings and principles of Just transitions in Paragraph 12 of the text, this paragraph defines the principles of JTWP, and the principles define power. Starting from the vision of Global North countries that attempted to shape the transition by their own economies, trade measures where the responsibilities are diffused, and mitigation dominates the scene. Where Global South countries stood firm on a transition rooted in equity, development rights, and not limited to emissions. In addition, Global South countries also stood firm on JT principles such as Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC), equity, energy poverty, poverty eradication, calling out the false solutions in the impacts of unilateral measures (including Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism CBAM), and keeping an eye on the need to support MoI. However, the opposition by both the UK and the EU opposed the strengthening of these principles and attempted to push JT into a mitigation-centric framing, which the Arab Group called out as inaccurate and discriminatory.

Repeatedly calling out the False solution in the negotiation rooms, the Arab Group and Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) brought CBAM into the room not as a side topic but as a structural threat. Their concern: transition cannot be “just” if unilateral trade measures restrict exports and undermine development pathways. What are the main concerns, and why is CBAM considered a violation? Because (CBDR-RC) has been strengthened to ensure equity and historical responsibilities in the JTWP, the EU's CBAM would become harder to justify within the transition framework. In addition, CBAM and Unilateral trade measures (UTM) are penalising developing countries that lack affordable green tech, failing the principle that developed nations should bear more responsibility. Needless to mention that the EU is weaponising climate action for trade advantage, this will result in shifting mitigation burdens onto the Global South. 

False solutions have also manifested in the attempts to deny access to Technology. For instance, Norway and the UK were both requesting the deletion of references to licensing, patent pools, open standards, and technology transfer. This blocking happens without any efficient argument, yet they were just protecting their “intellectual Property regimes” that keep developing countries dependent on the Global North's technology. This reflects and sustains the white supremacy in maintaining power and control over Technological Pathways that ultimately enhance the white ideology to control any fair transfer, any right for self-determination to Global South countries. 

• Despite the white Blocking, the Global South remains unified. 

One of the positive outcomes in the JTWP negotiations at this COP was the unified global south countries: G77+China, LMDC, LDCs, AOSIS, and the Arab Group. Observing the unification, tactics, and strategies was inspiring compared to what I observed in the past JTWP negotiations over the past two years for both SBs and COPs. Through analysing their interventions and power in the negotiations, the majority of them were prioritising sets of implementation, anchoring what JTWP manifested as material support, equity and fair play, development protection, institutional capacity, right for self-determination, moving towards implementation through mechanisms, and CBD-RC.  This was manifested in the insistence and consistency of the Global South countries like LMDC, Cuba, Arab Group around MoI. For instance, LMDC called out the absence around Article 9.1 obligations as a “fundamental gap,” rejecting blended finance as a substitute for concessional loans, Cuba rejecting any compromises around the MoI language, the Arab Group insisting on the historical responsibilities of developed countries and reflecting this in the MoI language. Their unity here is procedural and existential: it converts normative demands into enforceable resource flows. Even though the final text still needs lots of work around the finance flows of JTWP, this unity was a good sign in the room. The question here for the upcoming SB session would the global south countries remain unified? Will they bring their community's needs into this political game?

In addition, their unification around the institutionalisation of the JT mechanism, G77+China, LMDC, AOSIS, Arab Group, other countries like Tanzania, South Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya and others were consistently affirming the implementation of the Mechanism, not accepting any dilution into action plans or toolbox, insisting the Mechanism should also have a clear plan for stakeholders' input. Their unification also extended into the protection of their economies from Unilateral Trade measures, about UTM and CBAM style, recur as a common demand for safeguarding the Global South countries, they describe it as a threat to the convention principles and threats to the trade sector. Moreover, Egypt, Botswana and others pushed language to minimise adverse cross-border socio-economic impacts, referencing the Convention and Kyoto protocol. This unification has also shed its boundaries and provided a shield to protect their vulnerable economies from external measures that threaten their industrialisation and/or revenue loss, or even create more burdens in the transition. Finally, unification around the MoI and the JTWP Mechanism rejects a false solution that collectively harms their economies and addresses any potential shifting of responsibilities from North to South. If this unification continues, it will create a burden for the Northern country blocks against their false solutions and shirking of historical responsibilities. 

BAM Came to Life: Revealing CSO Advocacy for the Mechanism:

Civil society’s push for a JTWP mechanism began early in 2025. Constituencies such as the Women and Gender Constituency (WGC), together with other rights-holder groups, CAN, DCJ, and TUNGO, collectively developed the proposal for a Just Transition Mechanism, envisioned as a way to shift the JTWP from dialogues to implementation beyond the deadline in 2026. The first visible moment of mobilisation around this idea occurred during the Bonn SB62 session in June 2025, when the CSOs observer constituencies came into agreement on the theorisation of the Just Transition Mechanism, developing the concept required extensive research and coordination. 

WGC conducted research for the first draft proposal of the Just Transition Mechanism, followed by coordinating the discussions among Right-holder constituencies (CAN, DCJ, TUNGO, YOUNGO) to refine a version aligned with each group’s priorities. During SB62, advocacy efforts focused heavily on Global South negotiating blocs, including G77+China, AOSIS, LMDCs, the African Group and LDCs. CSO constituencies also aimed to strategise the advocacy through bilateral meetings with major Global North blocs such as the EU and the UK, and Global South countries blocs. Over ten days of negotiations and contact groups, the Mechanism has increasingly appeared in interventions from Global South Parties. In the preparation for COP30, however, the CSOs are coming together for an escalation campaign on Just transition to bring the mechanism into the final text. Lots of work is still needed for 2026, bringing the role of CSOs in the mechanism to be an effective seat in the process, bringing their community voice to the table, UTM discussion, and the MoI discussion, including finance as well.

About the Author: 

Hajar Al-Beltaji 

External Coordinator and Just Transition Policy Facilitator with ANGRY Alliance, JTWP Working Group Advocacy, Women and Gender Constituency (WGC).